Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 01-05-2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:1797, 12/00219 en 12/00220

De settlors hebben een “letter of wishes” aan de trustee gestuurd, gedagtekend juni 2001, waarin zij onder meer als wensen hebben geuit:

1. dat hun kinderen als primaire beneficiaries en de nakomelingen van hun kinderen als secundaire beneficiaries zullen worden aangewezen en dat als geen van beide voornoemde groepen van beneficiaries nog in leven zijn, bepaalde Joodse welzijnsinstellingen als beneficiaries worden aangewezen;

2. dat betalingen per familietak (“per stirpes”) zullen worden gedaan;

3. dat betalingen (uit het kapitaal en inkomen) als volgt en op de volgende tijdstippen dienen te worden gedaan:

- aan de settlors om deze in staat te stellen hun gebruikelijke levensstandaard te kunnen voortzetten;

- aan de kinderen (primaire beneficiaries);

- aan de kleinkinderen en verdere nakomelingen (secundaire beneficaries) (1) voor algemene ondersteuning maximaal € 75.000 per persoon per jaar, (2) voor speciale ondersteuning, bijvoorbeeld in verband met educatie, een eenmalige betaling van maximaal € 50.000 en (3) in het geval van calamiteiten, zoals invaliditeit en overlijden (van de partner, ouders of van een beneficiary);

4. dat voorafgaand aan het doen van betalingen advies bij een belastingadviseur zal worden ingewonnen om de fiscale gevolgen van die betalingen na te gaan in het bijzonder met betrekking tot de (belasting)wet van het woonland van de begiftigde; en

5. dat de trustee voorafgaande aan elke uitbetaling aan de beneficiaries schriftelijk toestemming van de protector heeft verkregen.

“(…) verzoek ik u tevens gemotiveerd aan te geven op basis waarvan u van mening bent dat artikel 47 AWR ten behoeve van cliënt op dit punt heeft te gelden.” (…) U geeft niet aan hoe de gevraagde informatie kan bijdragen aan het bepalen van het belastbaar inkomen van cliënt”.

“Echter tot op heden heeft u mij nog niet in staat gesteld om te toetsen of het feitencomplex juridisch en feitelijk identiek is aan de door u aangehaalde juridische procedures. Mijn fiscale belang is derhalve daarin gelegen om te kunnen beoordelen of de fiscale gevolgen voor de gerechtigden in de [naam 4] Trust dezelfde zijn als in de door u bedoelde fiscale procedures.”;

en:

“Of de kennisneming van bescheiden van belang kán zijn staat ter beoordeling van de inspecteur. Het staat buiten kijf dat uw cliënten hetzij als settlor, hetzij als beneficiary, betrokken zijn bij de [naam 1] Trust. Aan hun betrokkenheid kunnen fiscale gevolgen zijn verbonden. Om deze fiscale gevolgen te kunnen beoordelen ben ik afhankelijk van door uw cliënten te verstrekken door mij gevraagde informatie. Derhalve ben ik van mening dat de door mij gevraagde informatie van belang kan zijn voor de belastingheffing van uw cliënten.

Ik verzoek u derhalve nogmaals de gevraagde, maar nog niet overlegde stukken te verstrekken:

- de jaarstukken of een overzicht van de bezittingen en schulden van de trust vanaf 1997;

- welke vermogensbestanddelen, tegen welke waarde(n), op welk moment sedert de oprichting door de settlor in de [naam 4] Trust zijn ingebracht;

- hebben andere belanghebbenden bij de [naam 4] Trust vermogensbestanddelen

ingebracht, zo ja tegen welke waarde(n) en op welk moment;

- kopie van de letter of wishes.”

“2.17. De gemachtigde van eisers heeft bij brief van 21 juli 2006 herhaald dat de trustee geen jaarstukken wil verstrekken, en dat het disproportioneel is om van eisers te verlangen dat zij daarover gaan procederen. Voorts heeft de gemachtigde van eisers voorgesteld om de trustee te vragen om te verklaren dat de uitkeringen eenmalig waren, dat er slechts één inbreng is geweest in 1997 en dat daarbij geen situs-goederen dan wel andere vermogensbestanddelen die aanleiding gaven tot heffing van Nederlandse successierecht of inkomstenbelasting zijn ingebracht.

Het onder 2.24 van de rechtbank gemelde bedrag van € 12.675.500 komt overeen met het bedrag aan “Capital distributions” genoemd in jaarstukken van de Trust “FOR THE PERIOD ENDED 30 DECEMBER 2009” die [X] aan de inspecteur heeft toegezonden, en die de inspecteur bij brief van 28 september 2011 als nader stuk heeft ingebracht bij de rechtbank.

Bij de motivering van het hoger beroep zijn eveneens jaarstukken overgelegd van de Trust. Volgens die stukken beloopt het bedrag aan “Capital distributions” “FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2009” € 12.653.649.

De onder 2.24. van de uitspraak van de rechtbank bedoelde uitkering aan de kleinkinderen beliep € 80.000 per kleinkind en in totaal 9 x € 80.000 = € 720.000.

Aan de hand van opgaven van de gemachtigde heeft de inspecteur de totale uitkering bij opheffing van de Trust aan belanghebbende berekend op € 2.595.140, hetgeen hij heeft neergelegd in een als nader stuk (bijlage 7 bij de onder 2.9 bedoelde brief) aan de rechtbank gezonden overzicht.

“Re: The [naam 4] Trust

Dear Mr. [Y],

Recently the Dutch tax authorities have requested information with regard to the

abovementioned trust. These questions have been sent to the settlors and the beneficiaries

of the trust. One of these questions is whether they can provide the tax authorities with the

trust accounts of the last five years.

On behalf of the settlors and the beneficiaries I hereby ask you to send me the accounts

with regard to the past five years, so I can send them to the tax authorities.

Awaiting your reply, I remain,”

De trustee antwoordt hierop bij brief van 8 november 2004 aan de gemachtigde

als volgt:

“(…). The Trustees of the [naam 4] Trust have considered your request for disclosure of the past five years trust accounts.

Clause 30 of the First Schedule (Regulations) of the deed of settlement dated 14 May 1997,

made between [naam 1]and [naam 2]and The [naam 5]

Limited and another (…) and which is known as the [naam 4] Trust, reads as follows:

“Without prejudice to any right under the Proper Law to refuse disclosure of any document it is hereby declared that the Trustees shall not (subject to the Order of any Court of competent

jurisdiction) be bound to disclose to any person any document which:

(a) discloses his deliberations as to the manner in which he has exercised a power or

discretion or performed a duty conferred or imposed upon him, or

(b) disclose the reason for any particular exercise or non-exercise of such power or discretion

or performance of duty or the material upon which such reason shall or might have been

based, or

(c) relates to the exercise or proposed exercise of such power or discretion or the perfomance

or proposed performance of such duty: or

(d) relates to or forms part of the accounts of the trust.”

The Trustees have also considered the leading case on disclosure of information by Trustees to discretionary trusts, which is Schmidt v Rosewood Trust [2003] 3 ITELR 734. This is a

decision of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom. As the leading authority it is likely that

the courts both in Jersey (the proper law of the trust) and Guernsey (the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust is currently administered) would follow this case. (…)

Having considered the reason for the request, clause 30 of the first schedule to the Deed of

Trust and the case law, the Trustees prima facie opinion is that the Deed of Trust excludes the

Trustees from making this information available to any person (my italics). The Trustees

consider that the intention behind the clause was that any person requiring information set out

in sub- paragraphs (a) to (d) of clause 30 (as set out above) would need to make application to

a competent court to obtain such information. The Trustees further interpret the words “any

person” in clause 30 to mean all persons including the settlors and beneficiaries. Consequently, I regret to inform you that the Trustees have decided not to make the accounts of the trust for the past five years, available to you as the trust accounts are specifically contemplated in sub paragraph (d) of clause 30 of the Trust Deed.”

“Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

We hereby kindly request your attention for the following.

Further to the meeting that [gemachtigde] and [gemachtigde] have had on the 26th

of June 2007 with the Dutch Tax Authorities, we have received a letter from the mentioned

Tax Authorities on the 29th of June 2007.

In this letter (and as discussed during the aforementioned meeting) the Tax Authorities have

laid down a request for additional information concerning the trust and its beneficiaries.

The Dutch Tax Authorities have requested the following information:

 Annual accounts and reports of the trust over the respective years from the year of the setting up of the trust untill the present date;

 If the trust has a substantial shareholding in a company, the annual accounts and reports of the company in which the trust has a substantial shareholding;

 An explanation of the size and composition of the assets of the trust which have been contributed to the trust at the time of setting up of the trust (and all contributions that have been made since this date);

 Documents that prove the aforementioned contributions to the trust.”;

en:

“Because of the lack of information, the Dutch Tax Authorities question the full discretîonary powers of the trustees of the trust. In their opinion, this might lead to the assumption that

the assets of the trust should be allocated to the respective [naam 4] members. This

assumption made by the Tax Authorities leads to full tax liability on the side of the

aforementioned family members for all of the assets as currently held by the trust.”

“Messrs [gemachtigde]

Estate Planning Department

Mazars Paardekooper Hoffman N.V.

(…)

The [naam 4] Trust (the Trust)

Dear Sirs

Thank you for your letter dated 1 August 2007. (…)

(…)

The real issue that your request poses to us is whether as Trustees we can make

such information available to any party on request without being in breach of trust.

If we, as Trustees, are in breach of trust then there is potential liability for the

Trustees for any loss or damages that may occur as a result of such action.

Clause 30 of the First Schedule to the Trust Deed reads as follows:

“Trust Documents to be confidential:

Without prejudice to any right under the Proper Law to refuse disclosure of any

document it is hereby declared that the Trustees shall not (subject to the Order of

any Court of competent jurisdiction) be bound to disclose to any person any

document which:

(a) discloses his deliberations as to the manner in which he has exercised a

power or discretion or performed a duty conferred or imposed upon him, or

(b) discloses the reason for any particular exercise or non-exercise of such

power or discretion or performance of duty or the material upon which such

reason shall or might have been based, or

(c) relates to the exercise or proposed exercise of such power or discretion or

the performance or proposed performance of such duty, or

(d) relates to or forms part of the accounts of the trust”

Having considered the wording of this clause and your request very carefully we

have concluded that to supply details of trust accounts, details of the settled funds

and documents to prove such settlement to any or all of yourselves, the Tax

Authorities or the beneficiaries of the trust, will be a breach of trust by the

Trustees. Therefore we regrettably must decline to provide the documents

requested.

We think that if any of the beneficiaries or Dutch Tax Authorities want the

Trustees to disclose such documents then their remedy lies in making an

application to the Royal Court of Guernsey as the court of the jurisdiction in which

the administration of the Trust is currently performed or to the Royal Court of

Jersey, the court of jurisdiction of the proper law of the Trust, detailing the grounds

upon which they (the Applicant(s)) believe they are entitled to this information

given the specific provisions of the Trust Deed. If Trustees are ordered by such

Court to disclose these documents to such Applicants, we shall do so without

hesitation.

Yours faithfully

For [naam 7](Guernsey) Limited

as Trustees of the [naam 4] Trust

(…)”.

“[naam 7](Guernsey) Limited

Attn Mr [Y]

[adres]

GUERNSEY CHANNEL ISLANDS

Re: The [naam 4] Trust

Dear Trustee,

As you are aware from past correspondence with our tax advisor Mazars ([gemachtigde]) some issues have risen with regard to our tax position in the Netherlands. With regard to the outstanding discussion with the Dutch tax authorities (DTA) we would like your attention for the following.

The DTA would like to receive some information with regard to The [naam 4] Trust.

They would like to receive the annual accounts of The [naam 4] Trust as of the date

of incorporation until the most recent finalised accounts.

Our tax adviser already requested you several tirnes to submit this information to them in

order to end the discussion with the DTA and therewith getting total clarity on our tax

position. We are not able to submit the requested information ourself, as we do not have this

information at our disposal. In the past you informed Mazars that - after consultation with

your legal advisers - you were not able to submit this information, as you were of the opinion

this (most) possibly would lead to a breach of trust.

Although we are aware of your opinion on the previous request by our tax advisor, we would

like to emphasise the significance of the DTA receiving the requested information. At this

moment we are confronted with several legal stands on the basis of us not submitting the

requested information (annual accounts) to the DTA. Needless to mention this damages our

position quite heavily and in the opinion of the DTA eventually will lead to a shift of the onus

of proof (from the DTA to ourselves). You will understand this should be prevented at any

cost.

Bearing in mind the beforegoing we strongly request you to reconsider your previous thoughts which led to your opinion of not submitting the requested information to our tax advisor/the DTA.

Hoping you are willing to persecute our request and looking forward to receiving the annual

accounts from you!

Yours sincerely,”

Het stuk is niet gedagtekend. Het is ondertekend door belanghebbende, belanghebbendes moeder, belanghebbendes broers [naam 3], [betrokkene 1] en [betrokkene 1], en zijn zus [betrokkene 2]. Het dossier bevat geen brief of ander van de trustee afkomstig stuk waarin op het hiervoor geciteerde stuk wordt gereageerd of daaraan wordt gerefereerd..

In hoger beroep heeft belanghebbende voorts een op 11 mei 2012 gedateerde ‘legal opinion’ overgelegd van een op Jersey gevestigde firma van advocaten, ‘notaries public’en solicitors (hierna: de legal opinion).

In hoofdstuk 6 van de legal opinion is onder meer het volgende opgenomen:

“6. (A) (ii) Beneficiaries’ rights to information under a Jersey law discretionary trust

“Subject to the terms of the trust and subject to any order of the court, a trustee shall not be required to disclose to any person, any document which —

(a) discloses the trustee’s deliberations as to the manner in which the trustee has exercised a power or discretion or performed a duty conferred or imposed upon him or her;

(b) discloses the reason for any particular exercise of such power or discretion or performance of duty or the material upon which such reason shall or might have been based;

(c) relates to the exercise or proposed exercise of such power or discretion or the performance or proposed performance of such duty; or

(d) relates to or forms part of the accounts of the trust,

unless, in a case to which sub-paragraph (d) applies, that person is a beneficiary under the trust not being a charity, or a charity which is referred to by name in the terms of the trust as a beneficiary under the trust or the enforcer in relation to any non-charitable purposes of the trust.”

(…)

“36. The Board have to consider what rights or claims to disclosure the appellant has, (…)

(…)

It is fundamental to the law of trusts that the court has jurisdiction to supervise and if appropriate intervene in the administration of a trust, including a discretionary trust. (…)

(…)

Disclosure to discretionary beneficiaries: a proprietary basis?

43. Much of the debate before the Board addressed the question whether a beneficiary’s right or claim to disclosure of trust documents should be regarded as a proprietary right. Mr Brownbill [Hof: optredende namens de trustee] argued that it should be classified in that way, and from that starting point he argued that no object of a mere power could have any right or claim to disclosure, because he had no proprietary interest in the trust property. (…)

(…)

50. (…) But the Board cannot regard it as a reasoned or binding decision that a beneficiary’s right or claim to disclosure of trust documents or information must always have the

proprietary basis of a transmissible interest in trust property. (…)

(…)

54. It will be observed that (…) said that for an applicant to have a proprietary right might be sufficient, but was not necessary. In the Board’s view it is neither sufficient nor necessary. (…)

55. (…) the Staff of Government Division, which (para 35) accepted the submission (made on behalf of the appellant) that a proprietary interest, although often found, was not necessary. On this part of the case the Board agrees with the conclusion reached

by the Staff of Government Division, (…)

(…)

59. [Hof: in overweging 59 citeert de Privy Council uit Spellson v George (1987) NSWLR 300; een beslissing van the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Powell J), onder meer het volgende:].

“On the contrary, it is clear that the object of a discretionary trust, even before the exercise of the trustee’s discretion in his favour, does have rights against the trustee

(…) those rights, so it seems to me, are not restricted to the right to have the trustee bona fide consider whether or not to exercise his (the trustee’s) discretion in his (the object’s) favour, but extend to the right to have the trust property properly managed and to have the trustee account for his management,”

60. The Staff of Government Division quoted the above paragraph (and the preceding paragraph) from Powell J’s judgement and criticised him (…). Their Lordships regard this criticism as surprising and unwarranted.

(…)

Conclusion

66. Their Lordships have already indicated their view that a beneficiary’s right to seek disclosure of trust documents, although sometimes not inappropriately described as a proprietary right, is best approached as one aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to

supervise (and where appropriate intervene in) the administration of trusts. (…)

67. However the recent cases also confirm (as had been stated as long ago as In re Cowin in 1886) that no beneficiary (and least of all a discretionary object) has any entitlement as of right to disclosure of anything which can plausibly be described as a trust document. Especially when there are issues as to personal or commercial confidentiality, the court may have to balance the competing interests of different beneficiaries, the trustees themselves, and third parties. Disclosure may have to be limited and safeguards may have to be put in place. Evaluation of the claims of a beneficiary (and especially of a discretionary object) may be an important part of the balancing exercise which the court has to perform on the materials placed before it. In many cases the court may have no difficulty in concluding that an applicant with no more than a theoretical possibility of benefit ought not to be

granted any relief.”